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INTRODUCTION
In Forbidden Grounds,' Richard Epstein argues that we should
repeal laws prohibiting various forms of discrimination in contempo-
rary labor markets. However, the theories underlying Epstein's argu-
ment could have much broader ramifications. As John Donohue
observes in his excellent review: "Because Epstein argues from liber-
tarian first principles, . . . he could have written the same book, mu-
tatis mutandis, advocating the repeal of the laws prohibiting drug
use, sodomy, pornography, prostitution, gambling, or dueling." 2 In
particular, he also might have argued for the repeal of antidis-
crimination laws in other markets. In this Article, I would like to
focus my energy on how Epstein's discrimination analysis plays out
in four other market contexts: (1) historical labor markets (circa
* Professor, Stanford Law School. John Donohue, Lawrence Friedman, Pam Kar-
lin, Richard Sander, Peter Siegelman, and Eric Talley provided helpful comments.
1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
2. John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1992).
1964); (2) public accommodations; (3) housing; and (4) new car
markets. Applying Epstein's theory to these different market settings
exposes limitations of Epstein's analysis.
I. A HISTORY OF MANDATED DISCRIMINATION
One of the book's great analytic strengths is that Epstein provides
an internally consistent historical explanation for why freedom of
contract did not eradicate the invidious effects of race discrimination
prior to the advent of civil rights laws. Although Gary Becker and
other theorists have suggested that competition should drive discrim-
inators from the market,3 none has provided an explanation for the
long historical persistence of discrimination prior to the passage of
Title VII in 1964. Thus, in characterizing the conclusions of a per-
fect competition model fashioned after Gary Becker's "Economics of
Discrimination," Kenneth Arrow argues:
As a result, the competitive effect just studied assumes an exaggerated
form. Only the least discriminatory firms survive. Indeed, if there were any
firms which did not discriminate at all, these would be the only ones to
survive the competitive struggle. Since in fact racial discrimination has sur-
vived for a long time, we must assume that the model just presented must
have some limitation . .. .
To his credit, Epstein implicitly acknowledges that any theory of dis-
crimination needs to account for this history of discrimination. His
book endeavors to provide such a theory.
Put simply, Epstein argues that freedom of contract never had a
chance: prior to 1964, state law required employers to discriminate
against blacks;5 after 1964, Title VII prohibited discrimination. Had
state governments been willing to protect businesses that hired and
dealt with blacks, Epstein believes, unprejudiced entrepreneurs
would have efficiently served the needs of the black community. This
historical interpretation forms the very foundation of the book's
larger free-market thesis: by arguing that our pre-1964 history of
3. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
4. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN
LABOR MARKETS 3, 10 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
5. Epstein's historical thesis extends the argument of Jennifer Roback, Southern
Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161
(1984), reprinted in Labor Law and the Employment Market 217 (Richard A. Epstein
& Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985). Roback's thesis was:
[Jim Crow laws governing employment] can best be understood as attempts to
enforce a labor-market cartel among white employers that could not be en-
forced in any other way. The planters wanted to collude to hold down black
wages, both to increase their own profits and to solidify the dominant position
of the white race . . . . The laws were intended to accomplish what race
prejudice could not do by itself.
Id. at 1162. Epstein's contribution is primarily in realizing that this argument could re-
spond to the deficiency of Gary Becker's model in failing to account for our history of
discrimination.
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racial exclusion emanates solely from state action, Epstein summa-
rily rejects the alternative explanation that private bigotry wrought a
devastating injury upon African Americans.
While Epstein is to be commended for taking history more seri-
ously than other economists, his falsifiable theory is in this instance
falsified. But in our rush to reject Epstein's hypothesis it is important
that we also treat history seriously. In a recent review of Epstein's
book,e I criticized Epstein's argument in part by arguing that Jim
Crow laws "rarely placed restrictions on employers." This statement
was incorrect.
Since my review appeared, I have found evidence suggesting that
several Southern states, until the beginning of World War II, had
laws restricting the employment opportunities of African Ameri-
cans.7 For example, in several Southern states it was a crime for an
employer to entice workers away from another employer - and
prosecutions for this crime of "enticement" were disproportionately
used to prevent Southern planters from competing for black
laborers.8
I imagine that some people at this Symposium will be so intent in
refuting Epstein's historical thesis that they will argue that these
laws merely reflected the underlying private hatred. While I believe
that the laws were a reflection, they did not merely reflect. Jim Crow
laws hurt African Americans by putting the Leviathan's coercive
central power in the hands of private bigotry.
Nevertheless, this admission (that Jim Crow hurt blacks' employ-
ment opportunities) is much different from Epstein's argument that
freedom of contract would have eliminated all invidious effects of
private bigotry. As I said in my original review,
[Epstein's] claim that prejudice and bigotry wouldn't have affected the eco-
nomic opportunities of blacks (if private contracts had been respected) is
surreal. Jim Crow and indirect coercion were largely confined to Southern
states, but patterns of racial (and sexual) exclusion pervaded many parts of
the country. Even in the South, boycotts by bigoted employers and consum-
ers could massively restrict the profitability of integrated or all-black
production.9
6. Ian Ayres, Price and Prejudice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 6, 1992, at 30, 31.
7. William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 42 J. HIsT. 31 (1976). I thank Lawrence Friedman for bringing this
work to my attention.
8. See id.; Roback, supra note 5; Richard Sutch & Roger Ranson, The Ex-Slave
in the Post-Bellum South: A Study of the Economic Impact of Racism in a Market
Environment, 33 J. EcON. HIsT. 131 (1973).
9. Ayres, supra note 6, at 31. John Donohue does an excellent job of falsifying
Epstein's historical claim:
Both private bigotry and public laws hurt the economic opportunities
of black workers. Thus, even if the states had respected freedom of
contract before Title VII, private bigotry would have dramatically
restricted the economic opportunities of African Americans.
When Epstein describes his ideal of contractual freedom, he often
evokes the image of a minimalist government - one that only en-
forces contracts (and controls the use of force and fraud).10 In 1964,
however, the costs of enforcing such contracts would have been any-
thing but minimal. Private resistance to integration (by the KKK
and others) would have made it virtually impossible for the state to
commit to enforcing private contracts - recall, for example, the dif-
ficulty that federal authorities had in protecting the Selma marchers.
A vital component of Epstein's free-market theory is the existence
of a profit incentive to enter markets where inefficient discrimination
exists. Competition, however, will fail to eradicate bigotry if there is
no "first mover" advantage to employing and/or serving the black
community. It is doubtful that anyone would wish to be the first on
their block to break the color barrier, because doing so would create
an easy target for reactionary violence that could not be deterred
without massive government expenditures.
Social acceptance of racial hatred has arguably declined in recent
years, thereby making it easier to enforce a freedom of contract re-
gime today. This suggests that today it would be harder for groups
like the KKK to effectively mobilize in the face of entrepreneurial
integration. Viewed in this sense, followers of Epstein could more
reasonably argue that competition under a freedom of contract re-
gime might now eliminate the harmful effects of discrimination.
Let me be clear. I believe that allowing employers to discriminate
intentionally on the basis of race would hurt African Americans to-
day, but that this damaging effect would probably be smaller than in
the past. For example, changing Title VII from an immutable rule to
merely a default rule would harm protected workers, but the injury
would be smaller in 1993 than in 1964.11 A default-rule version of
Title VII might imply a warrantee of nondiscrimination, which an
employer could only waive by explicitly disclosing to employees and
If one accepts the view that segregationist legislation caused the exclusion of
blacks from the Southern textile industry, three conclusions follow: (1) the ex-
clusion would not be found prior to passage of the segregationist law . . .; (2)
the exclusion would occur only in areas subject to such legislation; and (3)
competitive pressures would undermine the racial exclusion shortly after the
unconstitutionality of the segregationist law was perceived. Yet, the evidence
seems to contradict all three points.
Donohue, supra note 2, at 1594.
10. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 19.
11. See Ian Ayres & Rob Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
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consumers that it retains the right to discriminate on the basis of
race.12 It is likely that in 1964, many employers in both the North
and the South might have routinely (and proudly) contracted around
such an implied warrantee - leaving black workers with little added
protection. Indeed, many public accommodations of the time openly
advertized their race discrimination ("whites only"). Today, how-
ever, the social and economic costs of affirmatively contracting for
the right to discriminate might be sufficient to deter many employers
from opting out of potential Title VII liability.1
Although Epstein argues for the repeal of Title VII, he should be
completely content with changing it from an immutable rule to a
default rule. Forbidden Grounds implicitly favors an "opt-in" regime
where employers would have to affirmatively warrant their intention
not to discriminate. But Epstein nowhere explains why an opt-in re-
gime is superior to an opt-out regime in which the default employ-
ment contract included an implied warranty against discrimination. I
predict that many fewer employees would be covered under Epstein's
opt-in proposal than under a proposal where employers had to explic-
itly opt out. To be sure, some establishments would contract to dis-
criminate regardless of the default. But even if immutability is less
important in 1993, default choice is more important. ,
Epstein's analysis of history attempts to move beyond prior eco-
nomic theories of discrimination that largely ignore the failure of
competition to drive out discrimination. Despite this strength, his
conclusion that competition and contractual freedom could have sig-
nificantly expanded the economic opportunities of blacks is uncon-
vincing. Because state law was not the sole force perpetuating
inefficient discrimination, it seems unlikely that conditions in 1964
would have permitted a minimalist freedom of contract approach.
The most important benefit of Epstein's analysis may be to force us
to grapple with the likely consequences of contractual freedom in
12. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 867 (1991) ("Following the Patterson rationale,
finding an implicit representation not to treat consumers differently in bargaining be-
cause of the race or gender would offer a free market alternative to civil rights interven-
tionism."); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 46-47 (1992) (discussing hypothetical sale of "racial preference licenses" by gov-
ernment to private parties).
13. Warranties that apartments will be in a livable condition or that products will
be useable are routinely presumed in contract law (absent express agreement to the con-
trary), but under the Forbidden Grounds' analysis contract law would presume that em-
ployment discrimination was lawful. Epstein not only wants freedom of contract, but he
wants to allow employers to avoid the discomfort of admitting when they do discriminate.
today's market.
II. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Epstein's analysis of history is possibly at its nadir when he tackles
the implementation of Title II, barring discrimination in public ac-
commodations. Here Epstein claims that: "The early instances of
noncompliance [with Title II] all arose when individual firms, eager
to obey the law, found themselves set upon by gangs of racists deter-
mined to shut them down by brute force."'
4
Though I do not profess to be a student of history, I find it im-
plausible that all noncompliance was caused in this way. Events of
the time suggest that the bigotry of owners caused at least some of
the noncompliance. 5 For example, Lester Maddox gained national
publicity shortly after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act when he
distributed ax handles to supporters in order to prevent blacks from
patronizing his Atlanta restaurant, the Pickrick.'6 Maddox's actions
are not consistent with Epstein's view that noncomplying firms were
"eager to obey the law.' 7 Indeed, the heinous conduct of Maddox
may have not only been profit-maximizing, but it also propelled
Maddox to Georgia's governor's office from 1966 until 1970.1s
As with employment, Epstein argues that state interference with
freedom of contract prevented the market from providing adequate
eating and sleeping accommodations for African Americans. But he
again fails to provide any convincing evidence that the state laws
were the "but for" cause of this failure. He confidently asserts:
Someone could have made a fortune catering solely to blacks who were kept
out of the white hotels that adopted segregationist policies. Yet . . . [n]o
firm could have entered the market in the face of the political forces that
were arrayed against it. The dog that did not bark gives the best evidence of
pervasive government involvement in this area. 9
Epstein's confidence seems misplaced. While government involve-
ment might conceivably deter an entrepreneurial entrant, the failure
14. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 127 (emphasis added).
15. Even today there are reports of explicit racial discrimination at public ac-
comodations that do not seem to be caused by private coercion. See Lynne Duke, More
Denny's Patrons Allege Racial Bias; Several Incidents Reported in 5 States, THE WAS!t.
PosT, June 17, 1993, at A20.
16. Ex-Governor Lester Maddox of Georgia has Heart Surgery, REUTERS, Apr. 1,
1991; Maddox to Campaign in Carolinas Against Dukakis, UPI, Oct. 17, 1988.
17. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 127. It is possible that Epstein just misspoke in mak-
ing this assertion. Earlier in the same paragraph he admits that "our most dramatic
recollections about the enforcement of Title II in 1964 revolve around the few establish-
ments that defied the law." Id.
18. Maddox defeated Jimmy Carter for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination
in 1966 and later served as lieutenant governor under Carter from 1971-75. See
REUTERS, supra note 16.
19. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 127.
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of entrepeneurs to attempt entry is equally consistent with the hy-
pothesis that there was not a fortune to be made without the pa-
tronage of prejudiced customers.
III. HOUSING
Epstein's only reference to our prohibition against race discrimina-
tion in the housing market is his criticism of a 1988 amendment
making it illegal for rental, condominium and cooperative units to
discriminate against families with children.2 0 Epstein argues that
this amendment "struck genuine fear into the hearts of many older
residents . . who just do not want to have children around."'" Al-
though Epstein only addresses the "families with children" provi-
sions of the Fair Housing Act, the thrust of his libertarian argument
surely suggests that it too should be repealed.
Conspicuous by its absence is any discussion of race discrimination
in housing markets. Epstein conveniently ignores the pervasive evi-
dence of past and present racial exclusion in real estate sales and
rentals throughout the country.22 Epstein cannot plausibly argue that
the restricted housing opportunities of African Americans are due
solely to legally mandated discrimination or some other statistical
theory.
Admittedly, state and local laws injured blacks' housing opportu-
nities. Several cities, for example, established zoning ordinances
which mandated segregated housing;23 even the Federal Housing
Administration established appraisal policies which flatly asserted
that integration of all white neighborhoods had a "value-destroying
tendency. ' 24 However, as Gunnar Myrdal concluded in An Ameri-
can Dilemma: "Probably the chief force maintaining residential seg-
regation of Negroes has been informal social pressure from the
whites. Few white property owners in white neighborhoods would
20. See Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 805(d),
102 Stat. 1619, 1621.
21. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 64.
22. See, e.g., George Galster, More Than Skin Deep: The Effect of Housing Dis-
crimination on the Extent and Pattern of Racial Residential Segregation in the United
States, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 119 (John M. Goering ed.,
1986); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Trends in the Residential Segregation
of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1980, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 802 (1987); John
Yinger, Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986).
23. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACY 623 (1962).
24. DAVIS McENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 160 (1960).
ever consider selling or renting to Negroes."2 The clearest evidence
that laws mandating discrimination were insufficient to achieve their
purpose was the wide-spread use of restrictive covenants - prohibit-
ing the sale or rental to various racial and religious groups.
Epstein might want to argue that the Fair Housing Act should not
be repealed (even though Title VII should) because housing markets
are not as competitive as are markets for labor. But in other writ-
ings, Epstein repeatedly asserts that the market for housing is pre-
sumptively competitive.26 The housing market clearly has had a
chance, but has failed to produce equal racial opportunities. The
passage of the Act has not been sufficient to eliminate the persis-
tence of disparate treatment 27 - even though the United States has
an extremely competitive market where voluntary contracts are by
and large enforced. Private refusals to deal and contractual commit-
ments to discriminate have massively restricted the housing opportu-
nities of African Americans, but these harms must be countenanced
by Epstein's libertarian analysis.
Indeed, from his other writings it seems that Epstein would be
willing to protect the right of property owners to contractually com-
mit to racially restrictive covenants. In a 1988 article entitled Cove-
nants and Constitutions,28 Epstein addressed the enforceability of
covenants that mandate discrimination:
Restrictive covenants have also been used to exclude persons from real es-
tate developments because of their race or religion. As a matter of Ameri-
can constitutional and statutory law, these covenants are now universally
regarded as illegal, precisely because of their adverse effects on third par-
ties. My purpose here is not to assess the desirability of constitutional rules
or statutes but only to stress again the general point. Any concern with
antidiscrimination is best attacked head on and does not raise any
problems with restrictive covenants that are not also found, say, with em-
ployment or with housing generally. It is very doubtful, therefore, that any
distinctive doctrine of covenant law can begin to reach this issue. Restric-
tive covenants of this sort touch and concern the land, are negative in effect,
and clear as to both intent and meaning, and are capable of recordation.
Yet all this only shows that the problem is better handled by other legal
rules which have discrimination, race, and religion at their core, and not by
25. MYRDAL, supra note 23, at 622.
26. Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 762 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited: One Re-
ply to Seven Critics, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1988) [hereinafter Rent Control]
("All competition requires is many buyers and many sellers in a market of free entry.
Housing rental markets easily satisfy that definition.").
27. The open nature of this discrimination was recently dramatized by ABC's
PrimeTime Live program "True Colors." Hidden cameras captured the disparate treat-
ment.of a black male and white male. Donohue, supra note 2, at 1608-09, also discusses
the program. The power of this visual proof supplements the massive body of fair housing
audits conducted since the passage of Title VII. See Yinger, supra note 22.
28. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 906
(1988) [hereinafter Covenants and Constitutions].
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the law of covenants.2"
Although Epstein states in this article that his purpose "is not to
assess the desirability" of antidiscrimination provisions,"° it is clear
that his purpose in Forbidden Grounds is to demonstrate that such
provisions are not desirable. He admits that "[a]ny concern with
anti-discrimination . . . does not raise any problems with restrictive
covenants that are not also found, say with employment." Given his
views about employment discrimination, one can deduce that Epstein
believes restrictive covenants mandating racial and religious exclu-
sion should be enforced.-"
The only unclear issue is whether Epstein would argue that the
existing restrictive covenants should spring back into force.3 2 These
covenants are still recorded and routinely included in closing docu-
ments. Epstein might argue that many current owners have, in
purchasing, relied on the nonenforcement of these covenants. But as
long as they purchased the land with notice that such covenants ex-
ist, at least some authors have argued that they have purchased with
the knowledge that the covenants may spring back into force and
have (effectively) assumed this risk.
33
Before neutrally assessing this issue, we might want to consult our
own deeds. Gunnar Myrdal, for example cites evidence that, Circa
1940, 80 percent of Chicago was covered by such restrictive cove-
nants.3 4 1 wonder what proportion of this audience might have to sell
their houses and move if we were to suddenly begin enforcing these
voluntary contractual provisions.
My goal here is to clarify Professor Epstein's position. As a nor-
mative matter:
A. Should we repeal all of the Fair Housing Act?; and
29. Id. at 918 (emphasis added); see also Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom
of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982).
30. Covenants and Constitutions, supra note 28, at 918.
31. I draw this conclusion because Epstein believes that there should not be any
"distinctive doctrine of covenant law" and because he argues that "restrictive covenants
of this sort" have all the required indicia of enforcement - that is, they "touch and
concern the land, are negative in effect, are clear as to both intent and meaning, and are
capable of recordation." Id. at 919.
32. An analogous issue concerns whether antiabortion laws that have been held to
be unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny would
spring back into effect if the Supreme Court were to overrule Roe. See, e.g., GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that common
law courts have power to invalidate statutes on grounds of desuetude).
33. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 511 (1986).
34. MYRDAL, supra note 23, at 624.
B. Should preexisting covenants spring back to life?
Epstein's answer to the first question surely must be in the affirma-
tive. If Epstein's argument is to be consistent with his past views, he
is forced to argue that government should have only (1) struck down
the laws that mandated housing discrimination and (2) eliminated
the violence and intimidation that interfered with the freedom to sell
and lease property. I agree with Professor Epstein that these are
laudable goals.
I am completely unconvinced, however, that refusals to deal and
restrictive covenants would not have continued to wreak havoc on the
housing opportunities of people who are currently protected by the
Fair Housing Act. Both refusals to deal and restrictive covenants
(which mandate such refusals) would be absolutely unregulated
under Epstein's analysis. While I agree that striking down Jim Crow
laws and eradicating private violence would improve the housing op-
portunities of blacks, I do not believe that free market competition
would eliminate the impact of racist preferences.
My inference that Epstein should favor the repeal of the Fair
Housing Act has the sound of a dramatic accusation - and Epstein
could undermine the need for all this labored analysis by saying: "Of
course the Fair Housing Act should be repealed; segregated housing
is efficient." But if this is true, why did Forbidden Grounds only
criticize the Act's prohibition of housing discrimination against fami-
lies with children? The title of the book notwithstanding, it seems
that the market for real property is a ground on which Epstein is
reluctant to tread.
IV. AUTOMOBILES
Epstein spends four pages critiquing a recent study of mine that
tested for race and gender discrimination in new car sales. 35 At the
risk of boring the audience, I would like to offer a few thoughts in
response. In my study, more than 180 independent negotiations at
ninety dealerships were conducted in the Chicago area to examine
how dealerships bargain. Testers of different races and genders en-
tered new car dealerships separately and bargained to buy a new car
using a uniform negotiation strategy.36 Epstein does a capable job
summarizing the controls:
The testers chosen were carefully controlled so as to appear to come from
the same young, educated professional class living in the same appropriate
neighborhoods; each buyer was instructed to express an interest in the same
car, and to indicate a willingness to provide private financing. All potential
buyers used the same bargaining strategy: buyers first obtained an offer
35. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51-54 (critiquing Ayres, supra note 12).
36. Ayres, supra note 12, at 818.
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from the dealer's representative and then made a counteroffer that indi-
cated knowledge of the dealer's cost; thereafter the subject offered a price
that split the difference between his or her original offer and the last offer
received from the salesperson. The experiment continued until the sales rep-
resentative refused to bargain or "attempted" to accept the last offer made
by the subject.37
At first glance, one might think that car bargaining provides an ideal
setting to test Epstein's free market hypothesis. Certainly, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the government mandates discrimination in this
market or that law enforcement turns a blind eye toward private
harassment of nondiscriminating sellers. Moreover, the market am-
ply fulfills Epstein's requirements for competition: "All competition
requires is many buyers and many sellers in a market of free en-
try." '38 Consequently, one would expect the power of market compe-
tition to eradicate any embarrassing effects of race or gender
discrimination.
However, after reading Epstein's analysis I come away wondering
whether his theories are susceptible to embarrassment - known in
more conventional economic terms as falsifiability. As an initial mat-
ter Epstein is not fazed by the raw evidence that dealerships charge
dramatically higher prices to black and/or female testers than to
white male testers. As reported in my initial study,39 the average
dealer profits for final offers made to different classes of testers were:
37. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51; see also Ayres, supra note 12, at 822. For the
record, Epstein mistakenly says that the testers were students. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at
51. Virtually all of the testers were hired from people responding to newspaper ads -
only a small proportion were currently students. I also fail to understand why the word
"attempted" is placed in quotations in the foregoing quotation. But these are inconse-
quential quibbles.
38. Rent Control, supra note 26, at 1286.
39. A follow-up study using 38 testers bargaining for more than 400 cars at more
than 240 dealers substantially confirms these results. In this larger data set, sellers sys-
tematically offered lower prices to white male testers. The offers to other tester groups
exceeded the offers to white males by the following amounts: white females $244; black
female $457; and black male $1288. Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender
Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, AM. EcoN. REV. (forthcoming 1994). In
the additional testing, black males fared worse than black females. As I noted in the
original study:
This suggests that individual characteristics of the testers may have influenced
the results. The black male tester in the initial experiment, for example was
himself a former car salesperson and is currently a law student. It is possible
that the lower offers he received in the initial experiment were by-products of
his overly aggressive deviations from the script.
Ayres, supra note 12, at 828 n.36. In the follow-up study, we tested for the presence of
individual tester effects using a "fixed-effects" specification and found no evidence of
individual effects among our larger group of 38 testers.
White Male $ 362
White Female $ 504
Black Male $ 783
Black Female $1,283
After restating these results, Epstein reasonably asserts: "The criti-
cal question is how to interpret these results. '40 But at this point,
Epstein's analysis becomes less clear. He avers at least indirectly to
some five different potential explanations for these results - but
never clearly says whether any of these explanations might cut
against his theories. Indeed, I find myself wondering what kind of
evidence could ever falsify Epstein's theories. To aid in the analysis,
I will try to divide his analysis into its five constituent parts.
1. Lack of Sufficient Control. Epstein begins with the standard
observation that these differences in final offers do not constitute
race and gender discrimination if the testers' behavior or appearance
differed:
Although Ayres tried to control for all relevant variables, there has to be a
sense in which he failed. He notes that his subjects were instructed to say
that they were able to provide independent financing; yet sales personnel
continued to ask questions about car financing (most often of black fe-
males), perhaps because they regarded any customer statement about fi-
nancing as a ploy that could not be believed uncritically.
41
While I agree with Epstein that it is impossible to precisely control
all dimensions of bargaining conduct,42 his analysis of this point is
inapposite. The tendency of sales personnel to question the testers'
assertion that financing was unnecessary does not prove that the test-
ers were nonuniform. It only indicates that the salespeople tended to
discredit the uniform assertion. Further, the higher tendency to ques-
tion the assertions of black females does not prove that the testers
bargained in a nonuniform manner: it may only indicate that the
salespeople made statistical inferences about the likelihood that the
uniform assertion was false based upon the tester's race and/or
gender.
To his credit, Epstein acknowledges that "[i]t is unlikely that
40. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 52.
41. Id.
42. Indeed, in the original article I concluded the methodology section by
admitting:
Despite these attempts to control for uniform tester behavior, at some level of
abstraction the non-verbal behavior of the testers must have inevitably di-
verged. Salespeople may have offered certain testers a higher price not because
of their race or gender, but because they blinked more often or opened the car
door more quickly.
Ayres, supra note 12, at 826.
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these hidden difficulties [concerning whether the testers were ade-
quately controlled] account for all the differentials that were re-
ported."43 This is not a trivial concession, as it implies that Epstein
acknowledges the existence of systematic race and gender discrimi-
nation - at least for buyers who adopt this bargaining strategy.
However, an acknowledgement of race discrimination is not an ac-
knowledgement of an embarrassing market failure.
2. Cost-Based Discrimination. For Epstein, the least embarrassing
explanation for race discrimination concerns cost-based differences.
If dealers charge black testers more, because black consumers are on
average more costly to deal with - Epstein would consider the
dealer's higher offers to black customers to be completely justified.
The essence of Epstein's argument is that if sellers "believed there
was more a chance that the deal [with a black tester] would fall
through," the sellers might be induced "to charge higher prices to
cover their own cost."
'44
It is not clear, however, that the belief of a high probability of
bargaining failure will cause a profit-maximizing seller to demand a
high price. For example, it might be more worthwhile for the seller
to start with a lower offer in such instances, thereby avoiding the
expense of bargaining over multiple periods. Indeed, many game-the-
oretic bargain models suggest that a higher probability of bargaining
breakdown will induce lower seller offers.45 Consistent with this find-
ing, Peter Siegelman and I have recently estimated the exogenous
probability of the deal falling through (implied from the sellers' be-
havior). We found that sellers act as if the probability of breakdown
is much lower in negotiations concerning black males than white
males. 46 Thus Epstein's analysis is doubly flawed: the dealers may
not believe that there is a larger probability that deals with black
customers will fall through; and if profit-maximizing dealers had
such beliefs, it would cause them to offer lower prices - not higher
prices.
Putting aside the niceties of this argument, the major point is that
Epstein only claims that "some portion" of the price difference may
be cost driven - suggesting that other portions of the disparate ra-
cial and gender treatment may be caused by other - and possibly
43. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 52.
44. Id. at 53.
45. See, e.g., Peter C. Cramton, Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs, 37
MGMr. SCL 1221 (1991).
46. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 39, at Table 5.
more embarrassing - explanations.
3. Revenue-based Discrimination. Surprisingly, Epstein never di-
rectly addresses the explanation that I believe has the strongest sup-
port:417 sellers may use race and gender proxies in order to extract
more revenue from different classes of buyers: "[G]roup differences
in search costs, information, and aversion to bargaining may explain
why profit-maximizing dealers charge white males less."' 48
Economists refer to this notion as third-degree price discrimination.
One would think that this is a slightly more embarrassing explana-
tion. Free market competition should protect minorities from any
discrimination that is wholly unrelated to the costs of doing business.
Yet Epstein is completely silent about the explanatory power of reve-
nue-based discrimination. He only indirectly engages this theory
with the following comments:
Even if one observed practice markets in which blacks and women paid
higher prices than white males, each and every voluntary transaction that
took place would improve the position of both buyer and seller. The only
effect of discrimination here would be to change the percentage of the sur-
plus from trade that is obtained by the two parties.
49
This is one of Epstein's more labored arguments because it insulates
all market failures (including monopoly overpricing) from normative
criticism. Surely the welfare of those who fail to trade also counts in
the efficiency analysis. Moreover, his larger argument that free mar-
ket competition would give blacks the same economic opportunities
of similarly situated whites fails even if the higher prices merely re-
present a transfer of consumer surplus to the producer. 50
4. Animus-based Discrimination. Finally, Epstein misstates my
conclusion on the most embarrassing explanation for discrimination
- animus. If the bigotry of the customers, employees and/or owners
of the dealership are the cause the dealers' disparate treatment, Ep-
stein would be at pains to extol the a priori virtue of free market
competition. Epstein writes that my "study did not reveal any form
47. In the original study, I wrote: "Although more study is warranted, it appears
that the revenue-based theory best explains the discrimination that the testers encoun-
tered." Ayres, supra note 12, at 845.
48. Id. at 849. Revenue-based discrimination may persist even in a market with
multiple sellers:
Anecdotal evidence suggests that at some dealerships up to fifty percent of the
profits can be earned on just ten percent of the sales. Profit concentrations of
this magnitude are crucial in understanding why competition does not elimi-
nate revenue-based price discrimination .... [T]he competitive incentive to
move away from bargaining to a stated-price system simply may not be com-
pelling because dealerships would thereby lose the profits from sucker sales.
Id. at 854.
49. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 54.
50. Moreover, the greater the distortion of the price paid by blacks, the more inef-
ficient their consumption decisions are from a social welfare standpoint - due to substi-
tution effects.
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of discrimination attributable to the prejudices of individual sell-
ers.'" I, however, concluded that "[a]nimus theories find more sup-
port in the data [than cost-based theories]. The testers, for example,
recorded several instances of overtly sexist and racist language by
sellers."52 Moreover, I stressed that "simple causal theories of dis-
crimination [may] fail to capture the mutually enforcing nature of
multiple causes. ' 53 The follow-up testing has produced additional ev-
idence that is consistent with seller animus." Although revenue-
based discrimination remains the best explanatory theory, it is wrong
to say that the study does not reveal any evidence of animus.
5. Private and Public Remedies. Epstein also criticizes the rele-
vance of the study by suggesting that private parties are better
equipped to circumvent the effects of discrimination than are public
efforts. The first argument is that even if the observed discrimination
were objectionable, buyers could "adopt some strategies that will re-
duce the variation to below that observed in Ayres' experimental
study."55 For example, Epstein argues: "If blacks or women know
that they are apt to get a good deal from some small fraction of the
market, then they can avoid other, less receptive dealerships and
their unattractive offers."56 This is an internally consistent theory. It
is however highly implausible. I could not econometrically identify
any dealership characteristics that were correlated with the level of
discrimination. The forms of race and gender discrimination were
strikingly similar across different types of dealerships. 7 Moreover,
ask yourself whether you have any idea about which dealers in your
city give the best deals (to people of your race and gender).
More plausibly, Epstein argues that the observed discrimination
might have been smaller if black and/or female testers had brought
along a friend or elicited a rival offer from a rival dealership. 58 The
51. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 53-54.
52. Ayres, supra note 12, at 846.
53. Id. at 852.
54. For example, there is some empirical evidence that the sellers' bargaining
strategy with black male testers was influenced by "consequential animus" - i.e., the
sellers gained added pleasure from gaining an extra dollar from a black male customer.
See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 39.
55. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 53.
56. Id. at 52.
57. This result tends to undercut the hypothesis that the disparate treatment is due
to certain kinds of animus. One would expect to find varying degrees of animus at differ-
ent locations.
58. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 52. However, Epstein misstates my results in arguing
that insisting on a test drive could induce lower offers. He reports that in my study
insisting on a test drive "was found to lower the final offer by $319[]." Id. That was not
possibility that nonwhite male testers could reduce the amount of
discrimination by employing these strategies, however, is undermined
by anecdotal evidence that race and gender discrimination may be so
ingrained in a dealership's behavior that it is hard to overcome with
simple strategies. For example, I offered a group of research assist-
ants a monetary prize if they could obtain a better deal in no-holds-
barred bargaining. My assistants were approximately my age, highly
educated and had been studying the car market. This contest's in-
centives did produce lower seller offers, but significant amounts of
discrimination remained: the black male and black female best offers
were more than $700 dollars higher than the best offer that I re-
ceived as a white male.
5 9
Even if black testers could get a better deal by bringing along a
friend or visiting additional dealerships, the study still reveals an im-
portant aspect of race discrimination because the white male testers
did not have to go to the trouble of undertaking the additional costs
of these counter-strategies. Perhaps the black and female testers
could have received the white male price if they had executed twenty
push-ups during the course of bargaining. The discriminatory effect
is found in the fact that the white male testers did not need to exe-
cute the push-ups to secure a low price.
Epstein even uses the likely resistance of black and female con-
sumers to criticize the ability of audit methodologies to measure dis-
crimination: "[I]t is most likely that blacks and women tend to
reject the worst dealer offers, so any observed price disparity is likely
to be smaller than those obtained by the simulation."' ° As with his
analysis of the efficiency of price discrimination, Epstein ignores the
fact that significant social costs of discrimination are created from
those who fail to buy. In the housing context, certainly those buyers
who are unable to buy because sellers refuse to deal or refuse to offer
a reasonable price represent cognizable victims of discrimination.
However, Epstein would not include such buyers in his social welfare
calculus because they do not trade at an "observed price disparity."
The practice of marginalizing the consumers who are rationed out
of the market is particularly important because in more than 70 per-
cent of the observations in my data, the dealer ultimately refused to
bargain further (when tester was last to concede). Epstein chooses to
my result. Instead, the study found "revealing that a tester had already taken a test
drive reduced the seller's final offer by $319. . . .Testers that provided dealers with
explicit evidence of competition (by revealing a prior test drive) received significantly
better deals." Ayres, supra note 12, at 848-49 (emphasis added).
59. Additional details of this "beat-the-boss" test can be found in Ayres, supra
note 12, at 828-29 n.36.
60. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 53.
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describe this outcome as "final offers that were rejected by. . . test-
ers"61 - but all testers showed an equal willingness to continue
making concessions as long as the dealership was. Tests ended either
when the dealership refused to make further concessions or when the
dealership attempted to accept one of the tester's concessions. The
dealership's unwillingness to make further concessions was particu-
larly frequent with nonwhite male testers. When the tester was a
white male, 25.6 percent of the tests ended in attempted seller ac-
ceptances; however, this figure fell to 14.9 percent for the other tes-
ter types. 2 Contrary to Epstein's analysis, the fact that sellers are
more likely to accept offers from white males actually biases our es-
timates against finding discrimination, however, since dealership ac-
ceptances only provide an upper bound for the sellers' reservation
price. That is, in those cases where dealers attempted to accept an
offer from a white male tester, the dealers might have been willing to
make an even lower offer, which would have increased our measure
of discrimination. Epstein's conclusion that "the level of disparity
observed in any test will be greater than that found in any active
market" 63 thus wrongfully ignores both the additional efforts of mi-
nority buyers and dealership refusals to bargain.
While Epstein argues that private counterstrategies could undo
any embarrassing consequences of discrimination, he is pessimistic
about any palliative role for government intervention, stating:
"[T]here seems to be very little that can sensibly be done to change
the basic situation. ' 64 In response to one of my suggestions that
dealerships might be required to reveal the average price for which
each make of car is sold or the size of the markup on an individual
transaction, Epstein responds that "a regulation of that sort would
doubtless wreak havoc with the traditional system of commission
compensation for car sellers, and would reduce their incentive to
close sales."6 5 I normally agree that we should be reluctant to adopt
regulations that intervene substantially in individual markets. But we
should be less reluctant to "wreak havoc" in markets that most peo-
ple in this country find so objectionable. Moreover, Epstein's conclu-
sion concerning the incentive to close seems counter-intuitive: if
61. Id. at 53.
62. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 39, at 13.
63. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 54.
64. Id.
65. Id.
salespeople received a fixed amount per car, they would have in-
creased incentives to close (because they would only increase their
salary by closing more deals); under the current system, however,
salespeople may very well be willing to accept a lower chance of
closing some deals if they can sell the car at a substantial markup.
And of course Epstein argues by ipse dixit that the burden should
be on interventionists to prove that regulation would improve the
current equilibrium:
It is not enough to show that there is some residual level of discrimination
in a market to make the case for regulation. It has to be shown as well that
the proposed cure can identify and isolate the evils in some cost-effective
fashion. In light of the avenues of self-help that are available to all custom-
ers, it seems unlikely that regulation could ever accomplish a net social
good. 66
This quotation - which tends to epitomize much of Epstein's schol-
arship - fails to explain why the burden of persuasion should rest
with those who want to eliminate discrimination. Although Epstein
maintains the theoretical possibility that an empirical "showing"
might justify regulation in some instances, I have the impression that
no empiricism about the workings of a free market could falsify his
theories to the extent that he would actually reach the second ques-
tion of whether regulation could be cost-justified.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have tried to show that invidious forms of dis-
crimination can persist in competitive markets even when govern-
ment has not mandated disparate treatment. In the housing and
automobile markets, there is strong evidence that race discrimination
is not cost-justified; yet competition in these markets has failed to
accomplish the goal of section 1981 that "a dollar in the hands of a
Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a
white man."67 In turn, this showing tends to undercut our confidence
that competition would eradicate invidious discrimination in
employment.
In concluding, let me turn to a public choice criticism of Forbid-
den Grounds. I continue to be amazed that Epstein, of all people,
offers no explanation for the tremendously broad base of support for
Title VII. Indeed, the book's introduction, entitled "Consensus and
its Perils," turns Epstein's own libertarian ideology on its head. Lib-
ertarians usually argue that individuals' preferences are the only
knowable indicators of value, but Epstein, for some reason, discounts
66. Id.
67. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
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personal preferences when it comes to our civil rights laws. He ad-
mits that there is incredibly pervasive support for the notion that
employers should not be allowed to discriminate on the basis of race,
but this support contradicts his theory that our civil rights laws hurt
not only whites but the vast majority of blacks. Epstein "proves"
that integration hurt some blacks because the owners of black base-
ball teams lost the value of their franchise when the major leagues
integrated - but even here I would bet that some of the owners
supported integration.
I once asked Professor Epstein, after a presentation at the Univer-
sity of Virginia, why virtually all African Americans supported Title
VII if the legislation injured them. Epstein's answer (to the best of
my memory) was two-fold. First, a small number of blacks are
helped by Title VII and these people control the lobbying organiza-
tions (such as the NAACP) which speak for their entire race. Sec-
ond, Epstein argued that the larger group of blacks (who are hurt by
Title VII) face enormous social pressures not to dissent. To his
credit, these explanations do not turn on false consciousness or irra-
tionality. As a libertarian Epstein cannot admit the possibility of
false consciousness without destroying the analytic power of revealed
preference theory and freedom of contract.
However, in admitting that black people are subject to powerful
social pressure, Epstein fails to appreciate how analogous forms of
social pressure might also distort the behavior of white people. If
Epstein is to be consistent, he should either retreat from the claim
that social pressure prevents the majority of blacks from opposing
Title VII or admit that the same type of social pressures could affect
the behavior of white entrepreneurs. In essence, Epstein cannot have
it both ways. Nonlegal pressures cannot distort the choices of blacks,
yet fail to distort the choices of other market participants.
Finally, I believe that one of the book's biggest shortcomings is
Epstein's failure to admit the empirically contingent nature of his
arguments. This is a criticism that is often levelled at law and eco-
nomics scholarship, but it is not a necessary attribute. For instance,
Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel do a much better job of
stressing empirical ambiguities and indicating when choice of effi-
cient law will turn on underlying facts.68
68. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 314 (1991) (for example, in analyzing mandatory disclosure
rules in securities laws, authors refreshingly admit "[w]e are left, for the moment at
least, with arguments rather than proof"); see also Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The
Epstein's willingness to make unqualified assertions belies his
nonempirical orientation. Earlier in this Article, I criticized Epstein's
implausible claim that "the early instances of noncompliance [with
Title II] all arose when individual firms eager to obey the law found
themselves set upon by gangs of racists . . ." (emphasis added) 69
Epstein makes a similarly implausible absolute in his concluding
chapter: "Anyone who works in academic circles, and I dare say
elsewhere, knows full well that all the overt and institutional dis-
crimination comes from those who claim to be the victims of dis-
crimination imposed by others."7 ° I find several aspects of this claim
to be patently false. First, Epstein's claim that all the discrimination
"comes from" those who claim to be victims is clearly wrong if he
means that it is caused by blacks and women. White males consti-
tute the voting majority at virtually every law school in the country 1
and most other academic departments. Thus, it is misleading to say
that discrimination "comes from" women and/or minorities.
But regardless of cause, it is indefensible to assert that all overt
and institutional discrimination is in favor of women and minorities.
Let me offer a personal counter example. I am the beneficiary of
overt institutional gender discrimination - in that I was given a
nearly full scholarship to Yale Law School because I am male.
72 I
received a Victor Wilson scholarship that is only given to males from
Kansas City, Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri expressly
refused to enjoin the exclusion of women by the trust document.
7 3 I
can honestly say that without this scholarship I would probably not
have attended Yale Law School and may very well have taken a
different career path. I believe that other professors could provide
many more serious instances of overt discrimination.
So in closing, let me adopt a rhetorical device that Al Gore used
repeatedly in debating Dan Quayle. I do not realistically hope to
change Professor Epstein's belief that Title VII should be repealed
- but I hope that he would rethink a few of his statements. Just as
I have conceded that I was wrong in claiming that Jim Crow laws
Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391 (1992)
(reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
69. See supra p. 7.
70. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 503.
71. See Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profes-
sion: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191,
200 (1991).
72. Some readers may notice the relation to Steve Carter's story of applying to law
school. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
73. Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310, 312
(Mo. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979) (administration of trust does
not rise to level of "state action" in violation of equal protection clause of fourteenth
amendment).
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"rarely placed restrictions on employers," I hope that Professor Ep-
stein will now concede that (1) at least some of the resistance to
Title II was not by firms "eager to obey the law"; and (2) at least
some of the overt and institutional discrimination in academics con-
tinues to be against the traditional victims of discrimination. In mak-
ing these concession, Epstein would be moving toward the empirical
grounds where the ongoing debate over many aspects of our civil
rights laws should take place.

